National Dialogue in the DRC: Understanding the Roots of Mistrust

Between facts, political perceptions and power dynamics surrounding the presidential initiative

Introduction

This third reflection continues our two previous contributions on the national dialogue process in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The first dealt with the issues of trust, representativeness, transparency and credibility linked to the ordinance of 13 September 2026. The second addressed a question that followed directly from it: how to ensure that the voice of populations and territories can genuinely travel up to the national level and shape the content of the future National Pact.

A reaction to the first contribution, however, raised another question. Its author wondered what might explain the perception of “bad faith” attributed to the President of the Republic in this initiative.

This remark deserves to be taken seriously — not necessarily because it would establish any particular intention on the part of the Head of State, but because it points to a broader question: why does an initiative officially presented as aimed at seeking peace, national cohesion and the refounding of the State provoke, among some actors, so much mistrust?

Several levels must be distinguished here. There are observable facts, the perceptions they generate, the interests of the different actors, and the political interpretations they draw from them. Conflating these levels would turn a political analysis into a trial of intentions.

The stake of this third contribution is therefore less to determine whether the Head of State is acting in “good faith” or not, than to understand the roots of the mistrust surrounding his initiative.

1. Mistrust did not begin with the ordinance of 13 September 2026

The first precaution is not to treat the current mistrust as an entirely new phenomenon.

In the DRC, political dialogues have often been organized during periods of deep crisis, with significant power imbalances between actors and diverging expectations as to their purpose.

Experience of previous processes has left different readings depending on the actor. For some, dialogues have helped avoid more serious confrontations and made it possible to seek political compromise. For others, they have mainly resulted in temporary institutional arrangements, without resolving the structural causes of the crises.

The President of the Republic himself situates the current process within this history when he states that he wants to break with a logic of responding to crises mainly through power-sharing, and to instead prioritize the consolidation of the State.

This reading, however, is not necessarily shared by everyone.

Mistrust can thus be fed by a collective experience in which successive dialogues have been associated with compromises whose effects were judged uneven or insufficient.

The first root of mistrust would therefore be historical: actors are not approaching a new dialogue with a blank political memory.

2. A presidential initiative that can raise questions

A second possible source of mistrust concerns the particular place of the President of the Republic within the current arrangement.

The Head of State initiated the dialogue, and the ordinance of 13 September 2026 places the Preliminary Organizing Committee under his direct authority. The Committee’s members, as well as the eleven experts of the technical secretariat, are appointed by him. The Committee must also report to him regularly on the progress of its work.

This configuration can be interpreted in different ways.

It can first be understood as the institutional expression of the Head of State’s responsibility in conducting national affairs: he takes the initiative for the dialogue, sets up the preparatory arrangement, and ensures that the first steps needed to organize it are undertaken.

But some actors may also question the guarantees of the process’s autonomy when the one who initiates it also plays a decisive role in appointing those tasked with preparing it.

This second reading is not merely theoretical. In the days following the adoption of the ordinance, several opposition and civil-society actors explicitly voiced reservations about the extent of the President’s involvement in preparing the process. Some argued that a dialogue meant to respond to a national crisis should not be organized or controlled by a single party.

This does not mean concluding that the President is necessarily seeking to control the dialogue. The institutional architecture alone does not establish such an intention.

The real question is rather this: what guarantees will allow the different actors to consider that presidential authority over the preparatory phase will not translate into unilateral control of the process?

This is where one must distinguish institutional responsibility for conducting a process from the trust other actors place in how that responsibility will be exercised.

3. The question of who controls the framework

Mistrust also arises when one of the actors has significant capacity to define the framework within which others are invited to participate.

In the current process, several important elements still need to be clarified by later stages: the composition and operating procedures of the Preparatory Commission, representation rules, monitoring mechanisms, methods for consolidating contributions, and the precise conditions for drafting the National Pact.

This situation can produce a paradox.

Those in power may see it as normal to begin with a preparatory arrangement before definitively fixing the rules of the dialogue. Their opponents may, on the contrary, believe that the rules should be negotiated before the process is genuinely under way.

These two positions do not necessarily rest on the same conception of dialogue.

For the former, it may be a matter of institutional efficiency.

For the latter, it may be a matter of trust: how can one take part in a process whose essential rules have not yet been collectively determined?

Mistrust arises precisely in this space between the stated intention and the way other actors interpret the institutional mechanisms proposed.

4. The crisis of trust between those in power and the opposition

It would also be difficult to understand current reactions without taking into account the general state of relations between those in power and part of the opposition.

The reactions recorded after the process was announced show that some actors contest not only technical aspects of the ordinance, but also the legitimacy of those in power to organize the dialogue themselves.

Some believe the process cannot be led by a single party. Others denounce what they see as an arrangement placed under presidential control.

These assessments must naturally be attributed to those who make them, and not turned into objective conclusions.

But their repetition reveals something important: the trust problem precedes the debate over the dialogue’s technical arrangements.

When trust is low, an institutional decision that might, in another context, be seen as merely administrative can be interpreted as a political act.

The same rule can thus be perceived differently depending on the relationship of trust between those who set it and those who must take part.

5. The question of intentions: what can and cannot be established

This is probably where the difficulty raised by the notion of “bad faith” lies.

A serious analysis must avoid turning a political disagreement into certainty about an actor’s personal intentions.

One can document a decision.

One can analyze its possible effects.

One can compare that decision with the statements that preceded it.

One can weigh the reactions of the different actors against one another.

But it is much harder to establish with certainty the real intention behind a political decision, except where that intention is explicitly stated or sufficiently documented.

In the present case, it would therefore be excessive to conclude, from the committee’s institutional architecture alone, that the President is necessarily seeking to stage a sham dialogue or manufacture an artificial consensus.

But it would be just as inadequate to ignore the fact that certain features of the arrangement can reasonably raise questions among the actors called upon to take part in it.

The relevant question then becomes: what guarantees could turn a stated intention into genuinely shared trust?

6. The power dynamics behind the interpretations

Perception of a political process also depends on the position each actor occupies.

Those in power naturally view the dialogue from the standpoint of their own responsibility: maintaining institutions, responding to the security crisis, preserving the continuity of the State, and seeking a political way out of national tensions.

The opposition, for its part, may consider that taking part in a dialogue risks strengthening the legitimacy of a process whose rules it precisely contests.

Civil society, for its part, may fear that citizens’ interests will be pushed behind negotiations among political actors.

Religious confessions may be called upon as spaces of trust or mediation, while themselves facing questions about their impartiality and representativeness.

These positions are not necessarily reducible to good or bad faith.

They also correspond to institutional interests, different experiences, and different conceptions of what a national dialogue should be.

Understanding mistrust therefore requires taking into account the relative positions of the actors.

7. The wider political context amplifies suspicion

Mistrust is also not built solely around the ordinance of 13 September 2026.

It is set within a broader political environment, marked by debates over the country’s institutional future, security, elections and political balances.

In such a context, any major presidential initiative can be interpreted through the political concerns of the moment.

An actor who doubts the intentions of those in power will not look only at the text presented to them. They will also examine the context in which it arises, prior decisions, officials’ statements, and the consequences they anticipate.

This is why trust cannot simply be decreed.

It is built through an accumulation of consistent behavior, guarantees and verifiable commitments.

8. The best response to mistrust: guarantees rather than assurances

Faced with a crisis of trust, declarations of good faith obviously matter.

But they are generally not enough.

Political trust becomes more solid when proclaimed intentions are backed by mechanisms allowing other actors to verify how the process actually functions.

In the case of the national dialogue, this could notably concern:

• the clarity of representation criteria;
• the transparency of consultation procedures;
• the diversity of the Preparatory Commission;
• the link between provincial consultations and national work;
• the ability to track how contributions are handled;
• the publication of the process’s main stages and rules;
• a clear definition of the commitments contained in the National Pact;
• and the existence of credible mechanisms for monitoring their implementation.

In other words, the best way to respond to suspicion is not necessarily to ask actors to trust, but to create the conditions under which they can reasonably come to trust.

9. From mistrust to trust: a reciprocal process

It would, however, be unfair to place the entire responsibility for trust on those in power alone.

A dialogue involves several actors.

The opposition will also need to determine under what conditions it is willing to take part constructively. Civil society will need to preserve its autonomy while contributing to the process. Religious actors will need to clarify their role. Citizens’ organizations must be able to bring forward concerns that go beyond partisan interests.

Trust does not mean the absence of disagreement.

A credible dialogue can perfectly well bring together actors who distrust one another.

What matters is that this mistrust can be framed by rules solid enough to prevent it from paralyzing the process.

It is therefore not a matter of asking actors to trust one another before the dialogue.

It is a matter of progressively building the institutional conditions that make trust possible during and after the dialogue.

Conclusion: understanding mistrust rather than judging intentions

At the end of this reflection, the central question is therefore not to determine whether the President of the Republic is acting in good or bad faith — such a judgment concerns intention and cannot be established from observable elements alone.

It is rather to understand why his initiative generates, among some actors, reservations and sometimes deep mistrust.

This mistrust can be fed by several combined factors: the memory of previous political dialogues, the trust deficit between institutions and part of the opposition, the President’s particular place in designing and setting up the arrangement, the uncertainties that still remain over certain aspects of the process, and the power dynamics and political stakes of the moment. None of these elements, taken alone, allows one to conclude there is a particular intention; together, however, they help explain the diversity of readings the presidential initiative has generated.

But their combination explains why the same initiative can be presented by its promoters as a search for consensus, and perceived by some of its intended audience as a move liable to be more tightly controlled by those in power.

It is precisely in this gap between the stated intention and other actors’ perception that a large part of the trust question plays out.

The challenge of the current process will therefore be to narrow that gap.

This will probably not be achieved through statements of intent alone. It will require rules, guarantees, transparency, credible representation and, above all, acts that let the different actors progressively verify that the process matches what it is officially meant to be.

At bottom, the question may not be whether each side believes in the other’s good faith.

It is whether the arrangement actually put in place will be credible enough to function even in a context where initial trust is lacking.

For in a democracy facing a deep crisis, the true test of a dialogue is not necessarily to begin in a climate of trust, but to have rules and guarantees that let actors who do not fully trust one another work together nonetheless. In other words, trust is not necessarily the precondition for dialogue; it can also be the result of credible guarantees and a properly framed process.

Victor Kashosi
Consultant in Organizational Development and Governance
kashosivictor@gmail.com
+243 818 137 972